

DRC Public Opinion Poll

Elections 2018: The Not-So-Silent Majority



““

It's easy to say that there is no consensus on the voting machine because so and so has claimed on the radio: "I am against it !"
But we also need to consider the silent majority that has no radio time. And, who has assessed it, so as to say that the majority is against it? Did you do a referendum on that? No !
So let's depoliticize this issue.

””

Corneille Nangaa,
President of National Independent Electoral Commission
July 11th 2018

The Congo Research Group (CRG) is an independent, non-profit research project dedicated to understanding the violence that affects millions of Congolese. We carry out rigorous research on different aspects of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. All of our research is informed by deep historical and social knowledge of the problem at hand. We are based at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University.

All of our publications, blogs and podcasts are available at: www.congoresearchgroup.org and www.gecongo.org

Created in 1990, the "Bureau d'Études, de Recherches, et de Consulting International", (BERCI) is a limited liability company dedicated to undertake research and evaluation projects to improve evidence-based decision-making in DRC. The first Congolese public opinion research firm, BERCI's activities focuses on development, good governance, statebuilding and peacebuilding related research. Our non-profit polls are jointly coordinated with Fondation BERCI, ASBL.

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Keys Findings

The Bureau d'Études, de Recherches, et de Consulting International (BERCI), and the Congo Research Group (CRG) at New York University, with support from the New York-based Social Science Research Council (SSRC) conducted a nationally representative political opinion poll across the 26 provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the first week of July 2018. The poll was carried out in the run-up to national and provincial elections, currently scheduled for December 23rd 2018, in order to better understand the attitude of the Congolese public toward the country political turmoil as it heads toward elections. The poll indicates that:

- The elections will be highly contentious. Sixty-two percent of those polled do not trust the National independent electoral commission (CENI) to carry out free and fair elections, and about the same percentage does not have faith that courts will decide electoral disputes fairly. A plurality (45 percent) said that if President Kabila's candidate wins, they will not accept the results, which is extremely troubling. Around half of the respondents said they would participate in a demonstration if elections are rigged or delayed.
- In the race for the presidency, the opposition is still far more popular than the ruling coalition, but Felix Tshisekedi, Jean-Pierre Bemba, and Moise Katumbi are now in a statistical tie. Perhaps most importantly, if the opposition does not unite, the ruling coalition could win a free and fair election—each of the opposition leaders would have around 19 to 17 percent of the vote, while together all of the candidates who are part of Kabila's coalition comprise around 19 percent of the vote (15 percent without Adolphe Muzito).
- Should the opposition have a common candidate? The question has become all the more important after Bemba's release; 53 percent of the respondents would like the opposition to unite behind one person for the presidential election. Respondents favored Moise Katumbi (28 percent), Felix Tshisekedi (26 percent), and Bemba (20 percent) for that position.
- There is widespread approval for the release of Jean-Pierre Bemba from the International Criminal Court, a decision published several weeks before the poll took place. Eighty-three percent thought his release was a good thing, compared with 66 percent who thought his sentence was unfair in the poll we conducted in October 2016. Bemba's release approval may be propelled by their strong dislike for Kabila (74 percent disapprove of him). Nonetheless—or perhaps because of his acquittal—a majority of Congolese (68 percent) still have a good opinion of the International Criminal Court (ICC).
- The electorate is impatient with the never-ending delays of the electoral process. Respondents are fairly evenly split on whether elections should be delayed so that the process can be rendered more credible; 36 percent are not in favor of revising the voting register to eliminate irregularities; and a similar percentage says it does not want to change the distribution of seats to reflect corrections to the electoral law. Still, despite their impatience, 66 percent of respondents are not in favor of electronic voting machines.
- Although the Kamina Nsapu uprising is no longer headline news, 73 percent of respondents from the former Kasai Occidental province believe that their security has not changed since two years ago. Sixty-nine percent of respondents of the former province of Equateur, as well as 65 percent of Nord Kivu feel the same way. Meanwhile, for 72 percent of Kinshasa's respondents, and 71 percent in Maniema, the situation has gotten worse.
- The campaign for a third term for Kabila is gaining steam. Compared with February, the number of people who would vote for Kabila has increased from 6 to 9 percent at the national level and from 21 to 37 percent in the former Province Orientale, his last and only stronghold.

The poll consisted of 1154 telephone interviews of Congolese aged 18 years or above across the 26 provinces of the country selected from a list of 2000 cell phone numbers obtained from a BERCI/CRG face-to-face nationally representative poll in 2016. The response rate was around 57 percent. The margin of error was +/-3 percent.

Methodology

This poll is part of a series of nationally representative pulse polls conducted by the Bureau d'Études, de Recherches, et de Consulting International (BERCI) and the Congo Research Group (CRG) at New York University. It was conducted in collaboration with the support from the Social Science Research Council (SSRC).


This telephone poll was conducted from June 30 to July 8, with a sample size of 1154 persons of 18 years of age and above, and recorded on electronic tablets using Open Data Kit (ODK). The respondents were recruited in the 26 provinces from a list of 2000 cell phone numbers obtained from a BERCI/CRG face-to-face nationally representative poll in 2016 across more than 400 sampling sites. The face-to-face database provided geographical spread and socioeconomic information about the respondents—their social class, education levels, place of residence, and age, as well as GPS location. The data were uploaded directly to a cloud-based server hosted by Ona.io, accessible to all partners in real-time. The margin of error for the poll was +/-3 percent and the response rate was 57 percent.

A final quality check was then performed to remove records with incomplete or duplicate answers, and we weighted the results by gender and geographical location in order to match national demographic distributions according to data of the National Statistical Institute (INS). There were no significant differences between the raw data and the weighted results, with the exception of the questions regarding voting preferences for presidential and legislative elections and perceptions of international partners, which varied significantly according to geographical location. This consistency of the results seems confirm, as our previous polls suggested, that much of Congolese public opinion does not vary much based on age, sex, class, or location. The following analysis presents only weighted data, with the exception of International partners' perception, to facilitate comparison with other BERCI/CRG polls.

Percentages presented in this report are the result of rounding to the nearest integer, which may add up to more or less than 100 percent.

Provincial breakdowns are often provided based on the 11 provinces that existed until 2015, as the sample size was too small to provide accuracy at the level of the current 26 provinces.

Enumerators were monitored for rushing, skipped questions, and other quality indicators. Feedback was provided to the teams on a regular basis.



Introduction


The coming weeks will be extremely tumultuous in the Congo. By August 8th, all presidential hopefuls must have registered to vote. By then, the public will know whether President Joseph Kabila will refrain from running for a third term—which is barred by the constitution—or will back a “dauphin”, a successor from his coalition. Although Prime Minister Bruno Tshibala confirmed on March 15th that Kabila would not be candidate in the elections, associates of the president have encouraged him to run, and billboards have been put up around the country proclaiming slogans such as: “Joseph Kabila, President of the DRC: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow.”



This campaign, the newly formed coalition between the presidential majority, opposition parties members of the current government, and pro-Kabila civil society named the *Front Commun pour le Congo* (FCC), as well as others statements made by Kabila’s allies, are feeding speculation that the president may attempt to run for a third term, despite the fact that:

- 77 percent of respondents are not favorable to a constitutional revision to allow Kabila to stand for a third term;
- 76 percent are not favorable to a constitutional change to allow the president to be elected indirectly by parliament;
- 69 percent have a bad opinion of FCC;
- 61 percent do not think that because the constitution was changed from two rounds to one in 2011 Kabila can stand for a 3rd term.

By August 8th we should also know whether Moise Katumbi, who is currently in exile, and Jean-Pierre Bemba, who was recently acquitted of charges at the International Criminal Court, are able to run for the presidential race.




On June 8th 2018, Bemba was acquitted on appeal of charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court (ICC), after spending a decade behind bars. On July 13th he received his new biometric Congolese passport, and he announced his return to Kinshasa for August 1st. Katumbi, on the other hand, was sentenced in absentia to 36 months in prison by a Congolese court for illegally selling property in June 2016. He has announced his return on several occasions, most recently for August 3rd. The Congolese government has not responded to his request for a new, biometric passport, after his old passport was confiscated by Belgian authorities on June 14th 2018 at Brussels airport.



Felix Tshisekedi, the son of the late opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi, is also a strong contender for the presidency; his rally in Kinshasa in April 2018 is the first that was allowed by the government since it banned demonstrations in 2016 and took place while he was negotiating the return of his father remains to the Congo. On May 25th, Felix Tshisekedi and Katumbi issued a joint declaration to unite for a single candidacy of the opposition. Moreover, the three contenders are still amongst the most popular politicians. Compared to February 2018 :

- 82 percent of respondents have a good opinion of Moise Katumbi (up by sixteen points);
- 71 percent of Bemba (up by five points);
- 70 percent of Eve Bazaïba, the secretary-general of MLC (down by two points);
- 68 percent of Felix Tshisekedi (up by two points);
- 64 percent of Vital Kamerhe (up by eight points).



The Legitimacy of the Elections

The National Independent Electoral Commission


Few Congolese think that the upcoming elections will be credible. When asked if they trusted the election commission (CENI) to organize fair and transparent elections, only 25 percent said yes. Sixty-nine percent have a bad opinion of its president, Corneille Nangaa—although he recently stated that his mission “is not to be popular or to forge trust, my mission is to organize elections.” Most troubling is that a plurality of Congolese—45 percent—would not accept the results if the ruling party’s candidate wins.



My mission is not to be popular or to forge trust, my mission is to organize elections.

Corneille Nangaa,
CENI President, June 22nd, 2018

This skepticism is rooted in a series of controversies in which CENI has become entangled. In September 2017, it announced that it was planning to use voting machines for the momentous upcoming elections, sparking fears of chaos and a lack of transparency. In Africa, Namibia is the only African country that has used similar machines, but its electorate is 3 percent that of the Congo, and the electoral commission invested extensive time in testing the machines and educating the population. Other experiences suggest that, in order to prevent controversy and logistical problems, voting machines should be phased in slowly, through low-stake elections, before being used for national polls and trust in the electoral commission should be high. Sixty-six percent of respondents in our July 2018 poll are not in favor of the voting machine, nicknamed the “*machine à voler*” or “vote stealing machine.” The voting registration process, which the electoral commission wrapped up in February 2018, has also raised questions. According to an analysis conducted by the *Organisation Internationale de la francophonie* (OIF), of the 40 million voters registered, over 6 million do not have fingerprints on file and another 6 million were *doublons* (double registrations) or minors. A further one million voter cards have not been accounted for, raising the possibility that millions of votes could be compromised on election day.



This skepticism is also expressed towards the courts that would adjudicate electoral disputes. Sixty-three percent of those polled said they do not trust them. The recent appointment of three new judges to replace departures from the nine-member constitutional court—which will judge electoral disputes related to the presidential and national legislative elections—has probably contributed to this. Two of these three judges are known to be close to President Kabila, while those who left the court had often expressed their reservations or had abstained from decisions that could benefit the president. Still, this skepticism of the judiciary is not new: in 2016, a BERCI/CRG poll found that 63 percent did not trust courts.




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The members of the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council expressed concern at the continued deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. While taking note of key milestones in the electoral process being reached, they expressed concern about remaining challenges to foster greater confidence in the process.

Joint Communiqué Issued by Members of United Nations Security Council, African Union Peace and Security Council, SC/13430, United Nations, July 19th, 2018

Given this situation, there seemed to be diverging opinions on whether it would be better to wait and reform the electoral process or to press forward. When asked whether presidential and legislative elections should be delayed because the process is not free or transparent, 43 percent agreed while 48 percent said no. Even when asked whether the voting register should be revised to eliminate voters without fingerprints, or the law on the distribution of seats should be changed to reflect changes to the voting register, only around 52 percent agreed. This either reflects impatience to get elections done with or cynicism that reforms would most likely have little impact.



General Political Opinion

In general, public opinion has not shifted much regarding the government perception. Most people have a bad opinion of President Kabila—74 percent, slightly down from the 80 percent in February 2018—and 80 percent disapprove of Prime Minister Bruno Tshibala’s government, 10 percent more than in February 2018. When asked about their own personal future and that of the country over the next five years, 67 percent of respondents felt “very or rather optimistic”, compared with 82 percent in February, a 15 points drop. Similarly, optimism regarding the country’s future dropped 11 points to 53 percent feeling very/rather optimistic since the February poll.

Personal Safety

The majority of respondents (52 percent) do not think that their degree of personal safety or that of their property has changed over the last two years, while for 34 percent of them it has deteriorated. Nonetheless, a breakdown by provinces shows variation. Although the Kamina Nsapu uprising is no longer headline news in national or international media, 72 percent of the respondents from the former Kasai Occidental think their security situation has not changed since in the past two years. Likewise, 69 percent respondents from the former province of Equateur, as well as 65 percent of Nord Kivu feel the same way. However, for 72 percent of Kinshasa’s respondents, and 71 percent in Maniema, the situation has worsened compared to two years ago.

Popular Mobilization

Popular mobilization has been an important factor in the electoral process. In January 2015, protests in Kinshasa forced the government to abandon a proposal to conduct a census before elections could be held, which could have delayed elections by years. Mobilization led by the *Comité laïc de coordination (CLC)*, (Lay Coordinating Committee), a Catholic organization, in early 2018 then led to increased pressure by regional governments and donors on Kabila. Indeed, street protests will probably be a critical factor in determining the upcoming elections. When asked whether they would participate in a demonstration if elections are delayed or rigged, half of the respondents (50 percent) said yes, a significant increase from 36 percent in mid-2016.



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The significant numbers of deaths during protests over the last two years, combined with the fragmentation of the opposition, seem to have deterred significant further action by the opposition on this front.

Conflict Trends (N°61),
ACLED, September, 2017

Still, 58 percent of respondents approve of the CLC’s ultimatum of resuming their public demonstration if Kabila does not explicitly states that he will not run in the upcoming presidential election. Large majorities also had a positive opinion of the various organizations spearheading the demonstrations and a poor opinion of security forces:

- CLC (77 percent);
- LUCHA (68 percent);
- Filimbi (67 percent);
- National Police (30 percent);
- Congolese Army, FARDC (26 percent);
- Presidential Guards (18 percent);
- National Intelligence Agency, ANR (18 percent).






FIGURE 1 | NUMBER OF CONFLICT EVENTS AND REPORTED FATALITIES BY EVENT TYPE AND LOCATION (JANUARY 2016 – AUGUST 2017)



SOURCE: CONFLICT TRENDS (NO. 61) - REAL-TIME ANALYSIS OF AFRICAN POLITICAL VIOLENCE, SEPTEMBER 2017, ARMED CONFLICT LOCATION AND EVENT DATA (ACLED) PROJECT



DO YOU HAVE A GOOD OPINION, BAD OPINION, OR NO OPINION AT ALL OF PRESIDENT JOSEPH KABILA?¹



	Jul. 2001	Oct. 2001	Nov. 2001	Jan. 2002	April 2002	Feb. 2002	Jul. 2003*	Oct. 2003**	Oct. 2007*	April 2009	June 2010	Sept. 2011	Sept. 2014	Jan. 2015	Mar. 2015	Feb. 2016	May 2016*	Feb. 2017*	Aug. 2017	Feb. 2018	July 2018
Good opinion	83%	58%	80%	72%	70%	52%	75%	83%	64%	60%	67%	36%	47%	35%	46%	43%	39%	24%	26%	19%	21%
Bad opinion	17%	23%	20%	15%	15%	23%	11%	8%	23%	35%	33%	48%	48%	64%	54%	57%	50%	72%	74%	80%	74%
No opinion at all	0%	19%	0%	14%	15%	24%	14%	9%	3%	5%	0%	17%	5%	1%	0%	0%	11%	5%	0%	1%	5%

1. (*) Nationwide Surveys; (**) Surveys conducted in the capital cities of the eleven provinces, all the other polls were conducted in Kinshasa. In May 2016 the question was addressed the following way : Soutenez-vous fortement, moyennement, ou pas du tout, la manière dont le Président Kabila gère son travail en tant que Président de la République? – “Fortement” and “moyennement” are considered “good opinion” and “pas du tout” is considered “bad opinion”.

The Presidential Race

Questions about the presidential and legislative races were open-ended: If elections were held next Sunday, for whom would you vote? Respondents could then provide any name they wanted, which resulted in a list of 43 politician's names for the presidential race and 163 parties/political alliances' names for the legislatives races. This obviously does not replicate the situation faced by voters in the actual election, where they have to pick from a much shorter list after several months of campaigns, but gives a good idea of popular sentiment six months before elections. Our data only allowed us to break down the results by the former 11 provinces, instead of the current 26.

The competition for the presidential race has changed significantly in the four months since the last BERC/CRG poll. Then, as in every other poll since mid-2016, Moise Katumbi had a significant lead over Felix Tshisekedi, within an extremely fragmented field. Katumbi's popularity has dropped since then, and Bemba's return is shaping up to become a major factor in the elections. If elections were held now, our polling suggests that three opposition candidates would be locked in a statistical tie: Tshisekedi, Bemba, and Katumbi would all have between 17-19 percent of the vote. Provincial analysis indicates that Bemba's score is highest in the former Equateur province. He is also the leading contender in the former Bas-Congo province with 34 percent of the hypothetical votes, although there are a high number of undecided voters there (41 percent).

Moise Katumbi is currently leading in three provinces: Katanga with 58 percent (down by 8 points), Nord Kivu with 38 percent (down by 1 point), and Maniema with 24 percent (replacing Matata who had been leading with 36 percent). Meanwhile, Felix Tshisekedi has improved his score by 33 points in the former Kasai Occidental, and by 9 points in former Kasai Oriental, while Joseph Kabila jumped by 16 points in the former Province Orientale. The former Prime Minister Matata Ponyo is no longer the leading contender in Maniema, his province of origin. He has been replaced by Moise Katumbi and Vital Kamerhe, who share the lead in that province with 24 percent each.

Taken together all of the presidential candidates from the current ruling coalition would get the votes of around 15 percent of those polled. If Adolphe Muzito—whose Parti lumumbiste unifié (PALU) is popular in the provinces of Kwilu, Kwango and Kinshasa—throws his weight behind the ruling coalition's candidate, that could add another 4 percent to his or her vote. This throws the question of whether the opposition can agree on a joint candidate into sharp relief. A narrow majority of respondents (53 percent) thought the opposition should just field one candidate, although opinion was divided on who that should be: 28 percent were in favor of Katumbi, 26 percent were for Tshisekedi, and 20 percent for Bemba.





FIGURE 2 | PREFERRED CANDIDATE AND POLITICAL PARTY HYPOTHETICAL VOTES IN THE 11 PROVINCES (%)²



2. (*) In the Bas-Congo province 41% of the respondents, and (**) 33% in the province of Sud-Kivu are still undecided.

FIGURE 3 | DISTRIBUTION OF POTENTIAL PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES VOTES IN THE 11 PROVINCES (%)










FIGURE 4 | DISTRIBUTION OF LEAD POTENTIAL PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES HYPOTHETICAL VOTES BY 26 PROVINCES (MAP)



The Legislative Race

Legislative elections are an even more unpredictable affair, as the new electoral law passed in January 2018 requires parties to get one percent of all legislative votes nationally in order to win seats in parliament. This threshold would have disqualified most of the parties currently in the National assembly, reducing their number from 98 to 21. In addition, a nationwide poll cannot replicate the race for seats within the 181 different constituencies across the country, and the question about the legislative election was an open-ended one: If elections were held this Sunday, which political party would you vote for? Respondents could then provide any party or alliance's name they wanted, which resulted in the names of 163 parties or political alliances for the legislative race. Only 13 out of 163 parties cited (out of 599 officially registered parties) reached the 1% threshold in the national poll. The MLC saw the greatest uptick with 5 points since February 2018:

Political parties reaching the 1% threshold limit

1. UDPS/ Felix Tshisekedi	(20%)	Opposition
2. MLC/ Jean-Pierre Bemba	(17%)	Opposition
3. PPRD/ Emmanuel Ramazani	(11%)	Majority
4. UNC/Vital Kamerhe	(9%)	Opposition
5. PALU /Antoine Gizenga	(6%)	Majority
6. ARC/ Olivier Kamitatu Etsu	(3%)	Opposition
7. UNDADEF /Christian Mwando	(3%)	Opposition
8. UNAFEC/Kyungu wa Kumwanza	(3%)	Opposition
9. ATD/Alphonse Benza Kongawi	(1,4%)	??????????
10. AFDC / Tshisumpa Tshakatumba	(1,2%)	Majority
11. Envol/ Delly Sessanga	(1,1%)	Opposition
12. AADI/ Davin Luyeye Makokoto	(1,1%)	Opposition
13. AAC/ Christelle Mputu Baata	(1,1%)	??????????
Total	(78%)	Above 1%
Sub- total 1	(57%)	Opposition
Sub-total 2	(21%)	Majority et al
Total other parties	(22%)	Less than 1%

Altogether, opposition parties— although what that label means in the current volatile political context is not clear—would garner around 58 percent of the legislative vote, while the current ruling coalition would get around 22 percent. BERCI/CRG could not ascertain the affiliation of numerous parties, most of which would be unlikely to cross the one percent threshold.





FIGURE 5 | LEAD PARTIES HYPOTHETICAL VOTES IN THE 26 PROVINCES





	ARC/KAMI	ENVOL	MLC	PALU	PPRD	UDPS/TSHIS	UNADEF	UNAFEC	UNC
Bas Uele	12%		19%	5%		12%			5%
Equateur			64%		3%	30%			3%
Haut Katanga	3%		3%		11%	14%	8%	8%	11%
Haut Lomami			2%		2%	40%	22%	22%	2%
Haut Uele	3%	3%			45%		7%	10%	10%
Ituri	4%				23%		4%		19%
Kasai			6%			18%		6%	13%
Kasai Central		4%			6%	90%			
Kasai Oriental		7%	6%			78%		1%	5%
Kinshasa	3%		12%	2%	9%	13%	0%	1%	3%
Kongo Central	2%		7%			5%			
Kwango	7%	7%	13%	17%	3%	7%			
Kwilu	10%		20%	40%	10%	4%	1%		4%
Lomami			10%		1%	65%	5%	3%	9%
Lualaba					12%	35%	42%	8%	
Maindombe			64%	36%					
Maniema	14%		10%	4%	13%	3%		7%	25%
Mongala			19%	6%		6%			6%
Nord Kivu	2%	2%	15%	2%	19%	17%	2%	4%	31%
Nord Ubangi			50%		19%				
Sankuru					20%	60%	10%		
Sud Kivu			4%		30%	4%			30%
Sud Ubangi	4%		65%						
Tanganika	6%		9%		11%	6%	6%	14%	
Tshopo		1%	23%		3%	52%	4%		14%
Tshuapa			88%		13%				

Foreign Involvement

Regional Influence

In the past two years, countries in region have placed varying degrees of pressure on Kabila to abide by the 2016 New Year’s Eve Agreement, to step down, and to hold elections. More recently, members of the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council reiterated in their July 19th Joint Communiqué “that effective, swift and sincere implementation of the December Agreement, including the Agreement’s confidence-building measures, as well as respect for fundamental rights and the electoral timeline, are essential for a peaceful and credible electoral process, a democratic transition of power, and the peace and stability of the Democratic Republic of the Congo”. However, to many around Kabila, regional pressure seems hypocritical, as most Central African countries have successfully managed to change or interpret their constitution to stay in power. Our poll indicates that only 3 percent of respondents think that the Congo destiny is determined by “neighboring or regional countries,” 31 percent by the international community, and 41 percent by Congolese themselves (the same percentages as in February). Angola, which has played the lead role in pressuring Kabila, has doubled its favorability among Congolese since mid-2018 and is seen now as favorable by Congolese as France or the United Kingdom. The most popular foreign countries are the United States (82 percent), followed by Belgium (80 percent), and the least popular is no longer Rwanda but Uganda instead with 19 percent.





Created in 1990, the “Bureau d’Études, de Recherches, et de Consulting International” (BERCI) is a limited liability Company dedicated to undertake research and evaluation projects to improve evidence-based decision-making in DRC. The first Congolese public opinion research firm, BERICI’s activities focus on development, good governance, statebuilding and peacebuilding related research. Our non-profit polls are jointly coordinated with Fondation BERICI.

CONGO RESEARCH
GROUP



GROUPE D’ÉTUDE
SUR LE CONGO

The Congo Research Group (CRG) is an independent, non-profit research project dedicated to understanding the violence that affects millions of Congolese. We carry out rigorous research on different aspects of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. All of our research is informed by deep historical and social knowledge of the problem at hand. We are based at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University.

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