If all goes well, eleven heads of state (or their delegates) will gather in Addis Ababa to sign the snazzily-titled: “Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region” (PSCFDRCR?)
What can we expect for this framework? An early copy I have seen suggests that it provides more questions than answers, although it does raise hope and expectations. (The copy is here.)
The two-and-a-half page deal rests on two pillars: Reforming the Congolese state, and ending regional meddling in the Congo. It then creates two oversight mechanism to make sure the eleven signatories take these imperatives seriously, with four organizations (UN, AU, ICLGR, SADC) as guarantors. As such, it marks an improvement in engagement in the conflict: there is a recognition that violence in the Kivus is deeply linked to national and regional developments, and it allows for neutral arbiters to hold the signatories accountable. Perhaps most importantly, we now have the formal involvement of the UN and a bunch of other eminent organizations in an official deal, which should mean there will be follow-up at the highest level.
So is this a peace process? I have often complained that, while violence has escalated over the past years in the Kivus, the last genuine peace process––with comprehensive peace deal, a strong mediation, and good donor coordination in support––ended in 2006. So are we back in a peace process?
Not really. Or more precisely: we don’t know yet. The agreement is more a statement of principles than a concrete action plan. And some of the principles seem to make that action plan difficult. For example, the oversight mechanism for Congolese state reform that in early drafts of the agreement included civil society and donors is now only made up of the Congolese government––donors merely provide support to the government, and civil society is not mentioned at all. So will a Congolese government that has hitherto been reluctant to reform its institutions be able to oversee itself?
On the regional mechanism, as well, details are lacking. It merely says: “A regional oversight mechanism involving these leaders of the region…shall be established to meet regularly and review progress in the implementation of the regional commitments outlined
above, with due regard for the national sovereignty of the States concerned.” No mention of how we are supposed to know whether Rwanda or Uganda are providing aid to the M23, or if the Congo has renewed ties with the FDLR, for example.
One of the gaping silences of the agreement is on armed groups, the reason this august assembly was called in the first place. What of the ICGLR talks in Kampala with the M23? What about other armed groups? No mention of whether the Congolese government will engage in talks, or whether the UN or anyone else should mediate––leaving in suspense the ailing Kampala negotiations. The document does mention deferentially the ICGLR on several occasions, probably as an indication that this new process will not automatically supplant existing ones.
Finally, the facilitation, which was initially supposed to be given to the United Nations, through the offices of a new special envoy, has now been converted into four guarantors: the AU, ICLGR, SADC, and the UN. It is unclear from this deal who among these four will take the lead. If the proof of this process is in the pudding, will too many cooks spoil the recipe?